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Problems with the Adoption of Proportionate
Share Liability in Illinois Remediation
Actions
INTRODUCTION

n 1995, the Illinois General Assembly repealed joint and several
liability in actions involving environmental remediation and
This new
replaced it with proportionate share liability.1
proportionate share scheme is contained in Section 58.9 of the Illinois
Environmental Protection Act (hereinafter Act). This section states in
pertinent part:
[I]n no event may the Agency, the State of Illinois, or any
person bring an action pursuant to this Act or the
Groundwater Protection Act to require any person to
conduct remedial action or to seek recovery of costs for
remedial activity conducted by the State of Illinois or any
person beyond the remediation of releases of regulated
substances that may be attributed to being proximately
caused by such person's act or omission or beyond such
person'sproportionatedegree of responsibility for costs of
the remedial action of releases of regulated substances that
caused or contributed to by 2 or more
were proximately
2
persons.
In the same piece of legislation, the Illinois Pollution Control Board
(hereinafter Board) was charged with adopting rules and procedures to
determine proportionate share.3 The adoption of proportionate share
liability in remediation (cleanup) actions seems to be at odds with other
parts of the same Act, and also with a section of the Illinois Code of Civil

1. Proportionate Share Liability, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35 § 74.1, No. R97-16,
(1998); 1998 111.Env. LEXIS 654, at *14 (Ill. Pollution Control Bd., Dec. 17, 1998)
(discussing reasons and rules adopted for determining proportionate share liability); see also
23 11. Reg. 515 (Jan. 8, 1999).
415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/58.9 (2000) (emphasis added).
2.
3.
415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/58.9(d) (2000) ("The [Illinois Pollution Control] Board
shall adopt, not later than January 1, 1999 . . . rules and procedures for determining
proportionate share.").

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22-2

Procedure.4 Moreover, the Pollution Control Board's adoption of the rules
and procedures for establishing proportionate share5 put the burden of
proving proportionate share on the complainant, contrary to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts 6 (hereinafter Restatement), and are at best
confusing when deciding to what party the proportionate share liability
scheme will apply.7
The implementation of proportionate share liability seems to have
been initiated in the wake of the Illinois Civil Justice Reform Amendments
of 1995.8 The core of the Civil Justice Reform Amendments (Tort Reform
Act) was Public Act 89-7. 9 Public Act 89-7 eliminated joint and several
liability in tort actions and replaced it with a scheme of proportionate share
liability based on fault.' 0 This Tort Reform Act (Public Act 89-7) was
held unconstitutional in its entirety in the case of Best v. Taylor Machine
Works." In Best, the Supreme Court of Illinois found that "Public Act 89-7
eliminates the doctrine of joint and several liability in all actions brought
on account of death, bodily injury to person, or physical damage to
property. Public Act 89-7 amended section 2-1117 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, replacing joint and several liability with proportionate several
liability."' 2 The amended version of section 2-1117 stated in full:

4.

The applicable provision states:
any action in which the trier of fact determines that the injury or
damage for which recovery is sought was caused by an act involving the
discharge into the environment of any pollutant, including any waste,
hazardous substance, irritant or contaminant, including, but not limited
to smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, asbestos, toxic or corrosive
chemicals, radioactive waste or mine tailings, and including any such
material intended to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed, any
defendants found liable shall be jointly and severally liablefor such
damage.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1118 (2000) (emphasis added).
5. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 741.100 (1998).
6.
Where the tortuous conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring about
harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground
that the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as the
apportionmentis upon each such actor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 4331B(2) (emphasis added).
7.
For the burden of proving proportionate share being put on the complainant, see
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 741.205 (1998). For applicability of the codified rules for
certain parties, see ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 741.105(0 (1998).
8.
Tort Reform Act, 1995 ILL. LAws 284 (Tort Reform Act); see also David L.
Rieser, Brownsfield Bill Promotes Sweeping Changes, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 621 (1996).
9.
Act of Mar. 9, 1995, Pub. Act 89-7, 1995 ILL. LAWS 284, 299 (repealed 1997).
10.
See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1117 (2000).
11.
689 N.E.2d 1057, 1064 (III. 1997).
12.
Id. at 1084.
...in
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§ 2-1117. Several liability. (a) In any action brought on
account of death, bodily injury to the person, or physical
damage to property in which recovery is predicated upon
fault as defined in Section 2-1116, a defendant is severally
liable only and is liable only for that proportion of
recoverable economic and non-economic damages, if any,
that the amount of that defendant's fault, if any, bears to
the aggregate amount of fault of all other tortfeasors, as
defined in Section 2-1116, whose fault was a proximate
cause of the death, bodily injury, economic loss, or
physical damage to property for which recovery is sought.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), in
any healing art malpractice action based on negligence or
wrongful death, any defendants found liable shall be
jointly and severally liable if the limitations on noneconomic damages in Section 2-1115.1 of this Act are for
any reason deemed or found to be invalid."
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court, that with
"absolute certainty section 2-1117 deprives the citizens of Illinois their
4
The
right to find a remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs.','
court also affirmed the Circuit Court's determination that section 2-1117
"unreasonably mandates an allocation of percentages of negligence to
nonparties without any kind of procedural safeguard, and hence, violates
5
the constitutional right to due process."' The Illinois General Assembly
has not, as yet, taken any action to explain why it should be constitutional
to abolish joint and several liability in actions for the remediation of
contaminated pieces of real property, when the Illinois Supreme Court has

Act of Mar. 9, 1995, Pub. Act 89-7, 1995 ILL. LAWs 284, 299 (repealed 1997).
13.
Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1085; see also ILL. CONST., art. I, § 12 ("Every person shall
14.
find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person,
privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and

promptly.").

Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1085; see also ILL. CONST., art. I, § 2 ("No person shall be
15.
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal
protection of the laws."). The assignment of percentages of negligence to certain parties in
an action automatically implies that some percentage of negligence will be assigned to a
nonparty, unless the sum of all percentages of negligence of all the parties in a suit equals
one hundred percent. Assigning a percentage of negligence to a nonparty thus violates that
nonparty's right to due process. See generally Newville v. Montana Dep't of Family
Servs., 883 P.2d 793, 802-03 (Mont. 1994) (discussing allocation of percentages of
negligence to nonparties).
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held in Best that the abolition of joint and several liability in actions
brought on account of physical damage to property is not constitutional.16
This comment explains how the proportionate share liability statute
became the law in Illinois, and analyzes the problems that such a hasty act
of the General Assembly presents. This analysis includes discussion of
some of the problems associated with the legislation, including the
allocation of orphan shares - those shares that cannot be apportioned to a
particular party. The impractability of enforcing the proportionate share
rules is discussed, along with the interplay of the proportionate share
liability statute with the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 7 and the
Restatement. The limited application and use of the proportionate share
liability scheme further reveals that this change in the law was not well
thought out and that the rules promulgated for its enforcement are
extremely vague and lack substance.
This comment concludes that the proportionate share liability scheme
passed by the legislature in Illinois is not good law. It is not good for the
environment, it is not good for the taxpayers, and it is not amenable to clear
interpretation.
The law eliminating joint and several liability for
environmental remediation actions in Illinois should suffer the same fate as
the Tort Reform Act,' 8 and for similar reasons.
I. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

The provisions of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act relating to
the implementation of proportionate share liability' 9 have taken an
interesting path becoming statutory law in Illinois. The provision
establishing proportionate share liability was first introduced as Senate
Amendment Number 1 on Senate Bill 0046 on April 20, 1995, by the
Senate Environment and Energy Committee. 20 Then, on May 16, 1995, the
same senator who sponsored Senate Amendment on Senate Bill 0046
sponsored the same provisions in Senate Amendment No. 1 to House Bill
0544.2k On August 18, 1995, the Governor of Illinois issued amendatory
vetoes of both pieces of legislation, specifically rejecting the abolition of
joint and several liability and the implementation of proportionate share

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1064.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101-5/22-105 (2000).
See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1064..
415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/58.9 (West 1998).
S.B. 0046, 89th Gen. Assemb., 1st Legis. Sess. (Il. 1995).
H.B. 0544, 89th Gen. Assemb., 1st Legis. Sess. (I11.1995).
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liability for remediation actions. 22 The amendatory vetoes by thenGovernor Jim Edgar of both House Bill 0544 and Senate Bill 0046
contained identical language on why he felt such a dramatic change in law
was not appropriate:
To consider such change is appropriate, but to reform the
state's liability scheme without addressing the far-reaching
consequences of such alteration is irresponsible.

My principle concern is that the state's ability to protect
human health and the environment would be impeded,
especially in emergency situations. Because the threshold
issues of liability and share must be fully resolved before
cleanups can proceed, there could be lengthy delays in
beginning remediation even in cases of substantial and
imminent danger ... Surely this was not the intent of the
legislation.
Additionally, by imposing the burden of proof for
causation and allocation of costs on the State, fewer cost
recovery actions will be filed and virtually none may reach
These are extremely costly and
ultimate resolution.
burdensome requirements imposed on the state that will
further frustrate our ability to protect the environment.

I [Governor Edgar] am equally concerned with the issue of
orphan shares, those shares of responsibility left uncovered
because no responsible parties can be identified or held
liable.23

See ILL. SENATE J., Nov. 14, 1995, at 5728, 89th Gen. Assemb. (relating to H.B.
22.
0544); ILL. SENATE J., Oct. 20, 1995, at 5524, 89th Gen. Assemb., (relating to S.B.-0046).
ILL. SENATE J., Oct. 20, 1995, at 5524, 89th Gen. Assemb.
23.
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Motions to override the Governor's amendatory veto on both bills
failed and the provisions were removed.24
In a puzzling course of action, the provisions repealing joint and
several liability 25 were added again to a piece of legislation cosponsored by
the same senator who added the propositions to the two earlier bills. In
House Bill 0901, the Conference Committee added the provisions after the
House and the Senate could not agree on a version of the original bill to
send to the Governor.26 On November 16, 1995, both Houses then agreed
on the version of the bill that would come out of the Conference
Committee, including the identical provisions replacing joint and several
liability with proportionate share liability in remediation actions, which had
been previously rejected twice by the Governor.27 This time, however, the
Governor signed the bill into law with the provisions for proportionate
share liability that he had rejected twice before.2 8
There is another confusing aspect related to the enactment of the
proportionate share liability scheme that is without explanation. In his
amendatory veto of Senate Bill 0046, the Governor specifically
recommended that with the deletion of the proportionate share liability
sections, the bill would have the Governor's approval. 29 The Senate later
moved to adopt the change recommended by the Governor, and the motion
passed. 30 Upon adoption of the Governor's recommendations for change in
Senate Bill 0046 by the Senate, the bill was sent to the House of
Representatives, where it died pursuant to the Governor's amendatory veto.
Subsection (d) of section 58.9 directs the Illinois Pollution Control
Board (Board) to adopt rules governing the establishment of proportionate
share liability. 3' The original version of the statute gave the Board eighteen
months to adopt these rules.
The statute was to be effective July 1,
1996. 33 This is quite an odd provision since the Governor approved the Act
on December 21, 1995, only about six months from its effective date.34

24.
See Pub. Act 89-0431, 1995 ILL. LAWS 4606; S.B. 0046, 89th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Leg. Sess. (I1l. 1995) (Bill dead in House Nov. 16, 1995).
25.
415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/58.9 (2000).
26.
See 89th Gen. Assemb., Conf. Rep., H.B. 901 (1995).
27.
See id.
28.
See Pub. Act 89-0443, 1995 ILL. LAWS 4731.
29.
ILL. SENATE J., Oct. 20, 1995, at 5524-25, 89th Gen. Assemb.
30.
ILL. SENATE J., Nov. 3, 1995, at 5662, 89th Gen. Assemb., (Consideration of
Governor's Veto Message).
31.
415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/58.9(d) (2000).
32.
Pub. Act 89-443, 1995 ILL. LAWS 4731, 4761.
33.
Id. at 4767.
34.
Id.
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This clearly inhibits the enforceability of the proportionate share provisions
since no rules to determine proportionate share were to be in place until
June of 1997. The Act was later amended, extending this deadline for the35
1, 1999.
Board to adopt the rules for proportionate share until January
For nearly two and one-half years since the effective date of the change to
proportionate share liability, the rules used to establish proportionate share,
as promulgated by the Board, were non-existent.36 It is difficult to
understand the impatience in passing a proportionate share liability
provision when the new scheme would virtually be unenforceable for lack
of Board rules.37
Pursuant to the directives of the Illinois Administrative Procedure
Act, 38 the Illinois Pollution Control Board offered public hearings and
proposed rules for first notice. 39 These first-notice rules were published in
the Illinois Register on September 18, 1998.40 Upon this publication, a
forty-five day public comment period began, and the Board held two public
hearings.
The Board made substantial revisions to the rules based upon
testimony at the public hearings and the public comments following the
first-notice opinion and order. On December 3, 1998, the Board adopted
the revised proposed rules for second notice.41 The adopted rules for
second notice specifically contained the determination of the Board that the
burden to prove a respondent's proportionate share should be on the
complainant.4 2
During the comment period following the proposed rules for second
notice, the Illinois Attorney General's Office filed its comments to the
proposed rules. In its November 23 filing to the Board, the Environmental
Bureau of the Attorney General's Office noted it had "serious concerns...
as to the Board's decision to put the burden of proving proportionate share

Pub. Act 90-0484, 1997 ILL. LAWS 5380-81.
35.
The final order of the Illinois Pollution Control Board adopting the rules for
36.
determining proportionate share was codified on December 17, 1998, two weeks before the
statutory deadline. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, §741.100 (1998).
The author could find no published cases from the Illinois Pollution Control
37.
Board between July of 1996 and January 1, 1999 that consider assigning liability against a
party equal to that party's proportionate share.
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 100/1-1-85 (2000).
38.
Reg. 16425-16440, (Sept. 18, 1998).
22 111.
39.
Id.
40.
See Proportionate Share Liability, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 741, Dec. 3,
41.
Reg. 16425-16440, (Sept. 18, 1998).
1998; see also 22 I11.
Reg. 529 (Jan. 8,
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 741 at 25-28; see also 23 I11.
42.
1999).
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on the complainant. "A3 The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency also
noted that:
[P]lacing the entire burden of proof on the complainant, the
Board has made recovery even more difficult by adding
unnecessary procedural obstacles . . . This sends the
message that the greater the commingling of the
contamination, the poorer the record keeping, and the less
cooperative one party is, the more likely one is to receive a
reduced share or no share."
The Illinois EPA proposed a system that placed the risk of insufficient
information on the parties responsible for the contamination rather than the
party seeking redress. Irrespective of this advice and the recommendations
of both the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency and the Illinois
Attorney General's Office, the Board, on its final order, adopted the rules
placing the burden for proving proportionate share on the complainant.45
II. ANALYSIS

A. WHY THE LEGISLATION WAS PASSED

The legislative action involved with this dramatic change in the law
thus begs two questions. First, what was the motivation for the Senate to
put the identical provisions establishing proportionate share liability in two
different bills, and then in a third, after the Governor had rejected the
previous two attempts? Second, why would the Governor then approve the
third attempt of the Senate to get this legislation enacted, after previously
rejecting the same provision twice before? The answer to both questions
may be found in one source: the pressure of the powerful industrial
lobbyists.

43.
Op. Att'y Gen. (Ill.) 1(1998).
44.
Id. at 7.
45.
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 741.205(a) (1998). But cf. Board Waste Disposal
Regulations, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 808.123, (placing the burden of proving
compliance with monthly quantity limitations on the party responsible for generating the
special waste). This indicates at least some precedent for the Board to place the burden of
proof on the responsible party, not an innocent complainant, as the Board did here.
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The Representative sponsor of the legislation, in his address to the
General Assembly in support of adopting the Conference Committee
Report, stated these provisions "were negotiated between the Governor's
office, and the Illinois EPA, and Industry..." 46 Industrial concerns would
obviously push strongly for proportionate share liability. Industries that are
found to have contaminated sites will only have to pay for that portion of
the cleanup that the State would be able to prove they were responsible for.
A site may have continuous contaminating activity by a business for a
number of years, and then if a new business takes over the operations, that
new business will not be held liable beyond the time it took over
operations.47
Businesses would definitely prefer a proportionate share liability
scheme to one in which they would be held liable for the entire cost of
cleaning up their site. Of course, the State has the very heavy burden of
proving proportionate share for not only the present business, but for all the
past ones that may have also contributed to the contamination. These are
precisely the reasons given by the Governor in his rejection of this scheme
twice prior. Placing the burden for proving proportionate share on the
complainant is contrary to the Restatement.4 9
In the comments following this section, the Restatement notes the
reason for placing the burden of apportionment upon a defendant is the
injustice of allowing a proved wrongdoer to escape liability merely because
the nature of the harm has made it necessary that certain evidence be
produced before liability can be apportioned. In such a case, the defendant
that evidence, or
may justly be required to assume the burden of producing
50
if he is not able to do so, of bearing the full responsibility.

See H.B. 901, 89th Gen. Assemb., Ist Legis. Sess, 71 (111. 1995) (statement of
46.
Rep. Persico).
Here is a possible scenario: An auto salvage company is sold to a new owner.
47.
The new owner continues to operate the auto salvage business. In operation, oil and
antifreeze, as well as brake fluid, grease and transmission fluid are all leaked and absorbed
into the ground. The State files charges with the Pollution Control Board, which finds the
business liable for the cleanup of the contaminated ground. Although the land was used as
an auto salvage site for twenty years, the current operation would only be liable for its
proportionate share that can be attributed to it, or since the time it took over operations. The
site may have had several different businesses conducting similar operations, and the
burdensome task of sorting out who is responsible for the other shares falls on the
complainant. Many formers operators of such sites may have since dissolved, making proof
and discovery virtually impossible. This would lead to many shares being incapable of
apportionment, leaving the State of Illinois and its taxpayers picking up the tab.
See supra note 19.
48.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433B(2) (1965), see supra note 6.
49.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 433B(2) cmt. d (1965).
50.
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Between the proven tortfeasor who has clearly caused some harm, and
the entirely innocent plaintiff, any hardship due to lack of evidence as to
the extent of the harm caused should fall on the former.5' Indeed, the
Illinois Attorney General's Office has argued the Board should follow the
Restatement in this case. It is sound public policy, the Attorney General's
Office argued, to impose on a wrongdoer the burden of proving his
proportionate share, and not put that extremely heavy burden on an
innocent party (as when the State acts as plaintiff and is involved in an
action seeking recovery for cleanup of contaminated property in which
more than one party may be liable)., 2 Thus, the Board places on the
complainant, often the State and its taxpayers, the consequences of
insufficient evidence when it is the liable party that is in control of the
evidence. The Attorney General's Office noted further that in many cases,
such evidence is not available, forcing the state and its taxpayers to pick up
the tab for orphan shares.53
B. ORPHAN SHARE PROBLEM

One of the Governor's concerns in his amendatory vetoes of the
proportionate share liability scheme was the problem of orphan shares, and
how to fund remedial actions for those shares that could not be apportioned
or that no party was found liable for.14 This problem was supposedly
corrected by the General Assembly by establishing a Hazardous Waste
Fund to pay for orphan shares as part of the same legislation that replaced
joint and several liability with proportionate share liability.55 The fund is to
rely on certain waste disposal fees as a revenue source.
The comments of several legislators, however, reinforce the
conclusion that the revenue source of this fund will not be enough to cover
the cost of cleaning up orphaned shares. Indeed, one of the legislation's
sponsors admitted, "it is woefully inadequate as far as dollars are
concerned to begin the clean up or for the remediation of these [orphaned]
sites.
,56 Another Representative referred to an article in the Chicago
Tribune in which it was reported in the late 1980's that Illinois had spent

51.
52.
53.
54.
message).
55.
56.

Id.
Op. Att'y Gen. (I11.) 2 (1998).
Letter from Attorney General in response to second notice (on file with author).
ILL. SENATE J., Nov. 14, 1995, at 5728, 89th Gen. Assemb. (Governor's veto
Act of Dec. 12, 1995 Pub. Act No. 89-0443, 1995 ILL. LAWS 4731.
H.B. 901, 89th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (I11.
1995) (statement of Rep. Novak).
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$34,400,000 to clean up eighty-six toxic sites, with no inflation.5 7 "[Now,
up probably hundreds of
we] are going to have $2,000,000 to clean
58
sites.
waste
industrial
of
dollars
of
millions
Additionally, it was noted in the debates pursuant to adopting the
conference committee report of the proportionate share liability scheme,
that "this tiny little fund . . . is being raided to provide a small amount of
help, which is going to be wholly inadequate to take care of orphan shares
in cleaning up industrial waste sites . . . [W]e are putting [the burden] not
only on the backs of owners, but on the backs of taxpayers., 59 Moreover, it
was testified to in the Environmental Committee that with joint and several
liability, people pay their proportionate share. 6°
The federal counterpart to the Illinois remedial legislation follows the
doctrine of joint and several liability in cleanup actions for industrial
The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
contaminated sites. 6!
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), however, also provides for
court apportionment of liability of two or more parties based on the
evidence presented and the information before it.62 While in federal cases
the court does the actual apportionment of liability, both sides need to
present evidence addressing factors to support or refute the factual
determination to be made by the court.63 The scheme followed by the
federal government is also supported in the Restatement:
The question whether the harm to the plaintiff is capable of
apportionment among two or more causes is a question of
law, and is for the decision of the court in all cases. Once
it is determined that the harm is capable of being
apportioned, the actual apportionment of the damages
among the various causes is a question of fact, which is to

57.
Casey Bukro, Cleaning Up the Superfund; Revisions More Fair, or Public
Burden, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 1995, § 3, at 1.
58.
H.B. 901, 89th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (111.1995) (statement of Rep. Skinner
who also noted that callers from his district reported paying $800,000 to clean up one tank
of gasoline that has leaked in their area).
H.B. 901, 89th Gen. Assemb. 1st Legis. Sess. (statement of Rep. Silva).
59.
See 45 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/45(d) (2000) (providing a right for a defendant in an
60.
environmental cleanup action to bring in third party defendants who may be liable for part
or all of the removal or clean up costs, with the Court apportioning liability).
See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
61.
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1994).
62.
See American Color & Chem. v. Tenneco Polymers, 918 F. Supp. 945, 955-56
63.
(D.S.C. 1995).
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be determined by the jury, unless the evidence is 6such that
reasonable men could come to only one conclusion.

C. PROBLEM WITH PROMULGATION OF RULES BY THE ILLINOIS POLLUTION
CONTROL BOARD

There is an additional source of confusion in the Board's adopted
rules for determining proportionate share. It is not clear against whom
these rules will be applicable. Section 741.105(f)(4) states that this part
(the rules) does not apply to owners or operators of a treatment, storage, or
disposal site for which a current permit has been issued or is required under
federal or state solid or hazardous waste laws.65
There is no indication of what this limitation means. There are no
definitions included in regards to who would be an owner or operator.
There is also no guidance in the rules as to under what conditions these
people must have permits, or to what a permit entitles them. Is a service
station that changes oil in automobiles a disposal site, requiring a permit? If
so, do these proportionate share rules apply to the owners or operators of
such an operation? It would seem clear that any business that deals with
any potentially dangerous substance, and has some quantity of that
substance stored on its premises, will be required to have some kind of
federal or state permit. It would seem that oil companies, gas companies,
paint companies, and all chemical companies, among others, would all be
required to have permits.66 Do the proportionate share rules not apply to
the owners or operators of these facilities? If the rules do not apply, are the
owners and operators then to be held jointly and severally liable, as the
statute would indicate? It seems this creates an exception to liability based
on permitted status, creating a classification system. Those who have or
should have permits are to be held jointly and severally liable, while those
who are not required to be permitted are held liable only for their
proportionate share.
This could potentially create an interesting equal protection challenge,
as it seems to treat similar parties (those who contaminate the environment)
dissimilarly (joint and several liability versus proportionate share

64.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 434(2) cmt. d (1965).
65.
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 741.105(0(4) (1998); see also ILL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 35, § 702.110 (1998) (defining the requirements for permits pursuant to the Act).
66.
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 741.105(0(4) (1998).
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liability).67 If individual employees are to be held liable, will their agency
relationship with the owners or operators be a factor, and will the doctrine
of respondeat superior then bar the enforcement of the rules against
them? 68 These are all questions that have no clear, immediate answer
ascertainable from the rules themselves and may take many court rulings
and interpretations to find a clear path for enforcement and applicability
standards for these adopted rules. Indeed, a dissenting opinion by a
Pollution Control Board member stated, "there is no way for interested
persons to know why the Board has made many of its decisions, or how the
Board sees the rules operating as a whole.,, 69 Nonetheless, the Board
adopted the rules before the statutory deadline of January 1, 1999. It
remains to be seen how they will be applied or enforced.7 °
D. THE ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE'S CONTRADICTION

Section 2-1118 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure provides that in
actions for recovery due to the discharge of pollutants into the
environment, any party found liable shall be held jointly and severally
liable. 71 This statute is clearly at odds with the proportionate share liability
provisions established by section 5/58.9 of the Illinois Environmental
Protection Act.72 It would seem, then, to be sure of a full recovery for the
remediation of a contaminated site, the preferred path would be to bring an
action under the civil procedure statute, rather than under the Act itself,
through the Illinois Pollution Control Board. An innocent plaintiff would
surely rather recover from a liable party who is found jointly and severally
liable to one that is found only liable for his proportionate share.

67.

See Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1087-89 (III. 1997)

(stating there is no rational basis for allowing joint and several liability for medical
malpractice cases, but mandating proportionate several liability for other torts).
68.
For example, if an employee dumps contaminates into the environment, a
question arises whether that is in the scope of employment. This raises many additional
issues beyond the scope of this article such as burdens of proof, employee training and
education, business operating procedures, negligent hiring, etc.
-69.
Proportionate Share Liability, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35 § 74.1, No. R97-16,
(1998) (proposed Rules for second notice) (R. Flemal, dissenting).
70.
See id. The dissenting member also voiced grave concern that the majority was
largely driven by the statutory deadline, without enough thought for interested parties to
participate in the adoption of the rules. Remember also, this is approximately two and onehalf years after the enactment of the proportionate share legislation, so would another few
months have made that much difference?
71.
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1118 (2000).
72. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/58.9 (2000).
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There is, however, an explanation for the inconsistency of these two
provisions. As discussed above, Public Act 89-7 (part of the Tort Reform
legislation) effectively repealed section 2-1118 by implication.
The
doctrine of repeal by implication is applied when two enactments of the
same legislative body are irreconcilable. 73 Although Public Act 89-7
directly repealed section 2-1117, it also repealed section 2-1118 by
implication since the amended 2-1117 called for the abandonment of joint
and several liability for actions due to property damage, which would
include environmental damage.74 As a general rule, repeals by implication
are not favored.75
This raises the question of whether finding Public Act 89-7
unconstitutional revives section 2-1118, and if so, how can both statutes
exist together? A statute that is repealed by implication is legally
eliminated and repeal of the repealing statute does not revive the repealed
law. 76 Public Act 89-7 was not repealed. It was found unconstitutional in
its entirety by the Illinois Supreme Court. 77 It is a well-known rule of
statutory interpretation that the "effect of an unconstitutional statutory
amendment is to leave the statute in force as it existed prior to the
amendment. ' 78 Since Public Act 89-7 amended section 2-1117 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, and was held unconstitutional, both section 2-1117 and
2-1118 were put back in place as if the amending action (Public Act 89-7)
was never enacted.79
The proportionate share liability scheme in the Act and the rules as
adopted by the Board for determining proportionate share only apply to
enforcement actions in which the State or a private party files a complaint
with the Board that seeks to require another person to perform, or seeks
recovery of the costs of a response action.80 Section 2-1118 would be
applicable if the State or a private party does not wish to file a complaint
with the Board, and wishes to use the civil justice court system instead in
73.
1993).
74.
75.

76.
77.
78.

Lily Lake Rd. Defenders v. County of McHenry, 619 N.E.2d 137, 140-41 (I11.
See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1066-68.
Spaulding Sch. Dist. v. Waukegan Sch. Dist., 164 N.E.2d 63, 66-67 (I1l. 1960).

5 ILL. COMP.

STAT.

70/3 (2000).

See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1104.
McCann v. Presswood, 721 N.E.2d 811, 815 (I11.
App. Ct. 1999); see also
NORMAN J. SWIGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2.07 (5th ed. 1992).
79.
The Illinois General Assembly specifically left environmental cases out of a
comparative negligence statute, preferring joint and several liability in these actions
"because so often there are hundreds of defendants that may, in fact, cause environmental
danger." S.B. 1200, 84th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Il. 1986).
Proportionate Share Liability, ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35 § 74.1, No. R97-16,
80.
(1998), 1998 Ill.
ENV. LEXIS 654 (Illinois Pollution Control Board, Dec. 17, 1998).
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an attempt to recover for damages to real property by environmental
contamination. The statutes, then, can both exist at the same time.
The complaining party then has to make a choice: proceed under the
Illinois EPA and not only be limited to recovering a known party's
proportionate share, but also be burdened with proving what that party's
proportionate share is,8 or bring a common law action under the Code of
since
Civil Procedure and be able to recover the full amount of damages
82
any defendant found liable will be held jointly and severally liable.
E. JUDICIAL PRECEDENT REQUIRING REPEAL OF PROPORTIONATE SHARE
LIABILITY

Public Act 89-7's replacement of joint and several liability with
proportionate liability was found unconstitutional for several reasons that
83
are closely related to the issues addressed here. It is reasonable to believe
that section 58.9 of the Act, in replacing joint and several liability with
proportionate share liability in environmental remediation actions, could
"deprive the citizens of Illinois of their right to find a certain remedy in the
laws for all injuries and wrongs. ..,84 If a plaintiff seeks recovery for
millions of dollars in remediation costs, but is limited by a proportionate
share liability scheme, it is more likely than not he will not be able to
recover the full cost of the remediation. Corporations move or dissolve,
records are not kept or lost, and multiple other discovery problems await
the innocent plaintiff who, according to desired public policy, undertakes
action to clean up a contaminated site.85
Additionally, the proportionate share liability scheme may be
unconstitutional by mandating an allocation of percentages of liability to
nonparties with no procedural safeguard, violating due process.86 If a
defendant is held liable for twenty-five percent of the damage (his proved
proportionate share), is it reasonable, or constitutional for the resulting
seventy-five percent of liability to be allocated to someone who is not a
party to the present action? The Illinois Supreme Court held that it was
not. 87

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 35, § 741.205 (1998).
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1118 (2000).
1997).
See Best, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1104 (I11.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
See supra note 43.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1086-87.
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The not-until-recently-adopted rules for determining a party's
proportionate share have greatly limited the provision's judicial scrutiny.
In Matteson Partnership v. James Martin, the first instance before the
Illinois Pollution Control Board requiring interpretation of the
proportionate share liability under the Act and the Board's rules, the Board
held the respondents jointly and severally liable with no mention of
proportionate shares at all. 88 A dissenting Board member noted that
"according to the legislation, the Board is precluded from ordering a party
to conduct remedial activity beyond remediation of releases of regulated
substances that may be attributed to being proximately caused by such
person's act or omission." 89 The majority here did not even consider
proportionate share liability and simply held the defendants jointly and
severally liable. The reason for either this oversight or simple disregard of
the law is not entirely clear from the Board's opinion.
The only other case to date before the Illinois Pollution Control Board
9
that even considered proportionate share liability is People v. Gilmer. 0
The Board held in Gilmer that the proportionate share rules and provisions
did not apply since the respondent fell within the exclusion under section
741.105(f)(4), as owners or operators of a site required to be permitted. 9'
Also, and probably more dispositive, was the fact that the State, as plaintiff,
was only praying for relief in the form of a civil fine, not recovery for the
remediation activities, so the Board never had to go into detail in its
reasoning why the proportionate share rules did not apply.92 In actuality,
the Illinois EPA spent $4.1 million to clean up and close the contaminated
site in this case, and any attempt to recover that amount of money from
93
respondents would have been futile.
It would seem likely, then, that given the opinion in Best, and the
closeness with which Public Act 89-7 and section 58.9 of the Illinois EPA
both abolish joint and several liability for a system of proportionate
liability, the latter is susceptible to the same fate as the former.

88.
Matteson P'ship v. Martin, No. PCB 97-121, 2000 WL 890181, at *15, (Ill.
Pollution Control Bd. June 22, 2000).
89.
Id. at 16. (McFawn, Board member, dissenting).
90.
People v. Gilmer, No. 99-27, 2000 111.
ENV. LEXIS 529, at *10 (11. Pollution
Control Bd. Aug. 24, 2000).

91.
92.
93.

Id. at *16.

Id.

Id. at *22, (noting Respondent's only assets were an IRA and their home).
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CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the survival of the General Assembly's adoption of
share liability in remediation actions involving
proportionate
environmentally contaminated sites is unlikely.
The proportionate share liability scheme appears to have been passed
hastily in the wake of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1995. 94 The scheme
undoubtedly favors industry over the innocent plaintiffs. Oftentimes, the
innocent plaintiff will be the State of Illinois and its taxpayers, as they will
have to pick up the tab for shares that cannot be apportioned, or orphan
shares. The Governor's concern over the cost to the State and its taxpayers
does not seem to be fully addressed in the legislation that was passed.95 As
noted, the fund established to pay for the remediation of orphan shares is
largely inadequate. 96
The fact that the legislation was effective July 1, 1996, but the rules
for determining proportionate share were not adopted by the Board until
December 17, 1998, nearly two and one-half years after the effective date
of the statute, is also an indication that this legislation was not carefully
thought out and was passed in haste, probably as a result of heavy
industrial lobbying. Moreover, there is also some concern over the
hastiness with which the Illinois Pollution Control Board's rules were
proposed and adopted. 97 This could lead to the conclusion that the
members of the General Assembly and the Board members involved here
may have given higher priority to the industrial concerns than to sound
environmental policy and the taxpayers of the State of Illinois.
One consolation is the fact that the proportionate share liability
scheme, and rules adopted by the Board for determining proportionate
share exempt owners or operators of storage, disposal, or treatment sites
from the proportionate share rules if they have or are required to have a
permit. These operations should then be held jointly and severally liable,
although this is far from clear from the legislation and will probably take
some judicial interpretation to figure out just how these provisions will
work in different situations. This leaves the small business owner, who
may not be required to obtain a permit, or may not be classified as a
storage, disposal, or treatment facility, to escape the large blow of being
held jointly and severally liable for an environmental cleanup action that
they may be partly responsible for.

94.
95.
96.
97.

See supra note 8.
See supra discussion of the orphan share problem Part II.B.
See supra notes 57-60.
See supra note 70.
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The people of Illinois will have to wait until the proportionate share
liability scheme is tested in the State's courts. The cases mentioned here
before the Illinois Pollution Control Board did not reach any of the
constitutional issues of equal protection and due process as discussed
above. It is likely this law will succumb to the same fate as the General
Assembly's other attempt to replace joint and several liability with a
scheme of proportionate liability.98
An important question to consider is who is going to bear the cost of
appealing a Board decision to the state courts, and what cost are they
willing to put forth in an attempt to have the proportionate share liability
scheme invalidated. An additional compelling question is how much
money the taxpayers of Illinois will spend cleaning up sites where no
proportionate share can be proven.
It is not understandable why the Illinois General Assembly has not
acted to consider the effect of Best's holding Public Act 89-7
unconstitutional on the statutes related to environmental protection and
toxic torts. It is clear that the Illinois General Assembly and the Illinois
Pollution Control Board did not adequately consider the issues raised here.
Upon the ruling in Best, the legislature should have reconsidered its
decision to replace joint and several liability with proportionate share
liability in environmental remediation actions, and should consider what
the related effects are on the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.

THOMAS CROWLEY

98.

See discussion of Public Act 89-7, and reasons for its invalidation supra notes

11-16 and accompanying text.

